中国不再为世界经济遮风挡雨(金融时报双语)
　　Why China’s role as the world’s shock absorber is changing
　　Since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, one country more than any other has provided the “heavy lifting” to support global economic growth. That country is China, the world’s second-biggest economy. The most compelling piece of evidence comes from China’s balance of payments position. In 2007, China posted a current account surplus the equivalent of 10.1 per cent of gross domestic product. Last year, the surplus was down to a mere 2.1 per cent of GDP.
　　自2008年全球金融危机爆发以来，在拉动全球经济增长方面，有一个国家“挑起的重担”超过了其他任何一个国家。这个国家就是世界上第二大经济体——中国。最具说服力的证据，来自中国的国际收支状况。2007年，中国的经常账户盈余相当于国内生产总值(GDP)的10.1%。去年，这个比例下降到只有2.1%。
　　This adjustment — enormous in the history of such things — occurred for two key reasons.
　　从历史上来看，这样的变化是非常大的。出现这一变化有两个主要原因：
　　• First, in the light of faltering export growth, Beijing shifted towards a “domestic demand first” policy, thanks to massive stimulus of infrastructure investment. Total investment spending rose from 41 per cent of GDP in 2007 to 47 per cent in 2013. Domestic investment thus rose relative to domestic savings, thereby reducing net capital account outflows.
　　首先，鉴于出口增长疲弱，中国政府借助大规模刺激措施，即大量增加基础设施投资，转向了“内需第一”的政策。总投资支出占GDP的比例从2007年的41%，升至2013年的47%。因此，国内投资相对于国内储蓄出现了上升，从而减少了资本账户净流出。
　　• Second, despite softening exports, Beijing tolerated continuous currency appreciation. In effect, the rest of the world devalued against the renminbi. Put another way, the combination of an ever-strengthening renminbi and, by international standards, a relatively high inflation rate left China nursing significant competitiveness losses even as others made competitive gains.
　　其次，尽管出口不景气，中国政府容忍了人民币的持续升值。实际上，世界其他地区的货币相对人民币都出现了贬值。换句话说，不断升值的人民币，加上相对较高的通胀率(以国际标准衡量)，使中国竞争力出现大幅下滑，而其他国家的竞争力上升。
　　Take these two factors together and it is clear that, in recent years, China was the world’s “consumer of last resort”, a role more traditionally played by the US. As many other nations — particularly the US and much of Europe — embarked on a “great deleveraging”, Beijing provided the counterweight. As others saved, China borrowed — most obviously through a rapid expansion of so-called shadow banking.
　　综合以上两个因素，明显可以看出，近年来，中国成了世界的“最后的消费者”，而传统上这一角色更多是由美国扮演。随着其他许多经济体——尤其是美国和欧洲部分地区——开启“大规模去杠杆”，北京方面起到了平衡的作用。其他国家获救了，但中国却负债累累——最明显的是影子银行迅速扩张所带来的债务膨胀。
　　Had China not performed this role, the world would have faced a far greater crisis.
　　如果中国没有扮演这样的角色，世界面临的危机可能要严重得多。
　　Imagine that Chinese infrastructure investment had not surged. Commodity prices would not have recovered in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis. Many emerging nations would have found themselves short of export revenues and, in some cases, faced with immediate balance-of-payments crises.
　　想象一下，如果中国没有大幅增加基础设施投资会怎样?那么，在金融危机后，大宗商品价格就不会快速回升。许多新兴国家会发现本国缺少出口收入，而且在某些情况下，直接面临着国际收支危机。
　　Or imagine the renminbi had not soared. The rest of the world would not have devalued, monetary conditions for many countries would have been tighter and, as a result, global deflationary pressures would have been far more intense than they have proved to be.
　　再想象一下，如果人民币没有大幅升值，结果又会怎样?世界其他地区的货币就不会贬值，许多国家的货币环境会比现在更加紧缩，结果是，全球通缩压力将会比实际情况严重得多。
　　So China has been the shock absorber for the global economy, a punch bag seemingly able to soak up the recessionary blows that would otherwise have derailed global growth.
　　所以说，中国充当了全球经济的减震器，像一个沙袋，似乎能够吸收那些本可能阻碍全球增长的衰退冲击。
　　Playing the punchbag role has, however, left the country’s economy vulnerable. One simple way to demonstrate this is via changes in consensus expectations for Chinese economic growth. Since 2010, initial growth expectations have simply been too high, a trend that has become worryingly entrenched as the renminbi has strengthened.
　　然而，扮演沙袋角色使中国经济变得脆弱。要证明这一点，一个简单方法是观察对中国经济增长的普遍预期的变化。自2010年以后，增长预期一开始就有点过高，而随着人民币走强，这一趋势变得稳固得令人担忧。
　　Unfortunately, China’s role as a “stabiliser” for the global economy has contributed to instability within the country itself: an overheated property market, a substantial increase in indebtedness, a roller-coaster ride for the stock market and a declining marginal rate of return on capital spending. So the People’s Bank of China’s actions in the second week of August — interpreted variously as either the beginnings of a major devaluation or a modest market-led adjustment — might be regarded instead as part of an attempt to shift the balance of risks away from China back to the rest of the world.
　　不幸的是，中国承担全球经济“稳定器”的角色已经导致本国内部的不稳定：过热的房地产市场、负债大幅增加、股市过山车般暴涨暴跌，以及资本支出边际回报率下降。因此，中国央行在今年8月第二周采取的举措——被解读为要么是大幅贬值的开始，要么是适度的市场导向调整——或许可以视为是中国要让风险平衡从本国重新回到世界其他地区的尝试的一部分。
　　After all, no economy can forever be a shock absorber. The last decade has shown that: the US bumped into the subprime crisis, the eurozone periphery ended up with a series of sovereign bond crises and Greece ultimately suffered an economic collapse on a par with the Great Depression.
　　毕竟，任何经济体都不可能永远充当减震器。过去十年的经历表明了这一点：美国发生了次贷危机，欧元区外围国家接连遭遇主权债务危机，希腊最终陷入了一场不亚于“大萧条”(Great Depression)的经济危机。
　　China’s currency actions should be seen in this light. The last thing it now needs is a further appreciation of the real exchange rate. To countenance an additional upward move would potentially create imbalances reminiscent of those the European periphery saw in the years before the onset of the 2010-2012 eurozone crisis.
　　应该从这个角度来看待中国的汇率调整举措。中国现在最不需要的就是人民币实际汇率的进一步升值。容许人民币继续上行有可能会导致失衡，就好比欧元区外围国家在2010年至2012年欧元区危机爆发前几年的情形一样。
　　This implies that the global economy may need a new shock absorber. Many have pinned their hopes on a sustained US recovery yet, to date, any acceleration in growth has been, to say the least, modest. Moreover, if the Federal Reserve decides to raise interest rates before the year is out, the US economy’s ability to act as a shock absorber may be compromised.
　　这意味着，全球经济可能需要一个新的减震器。许多人寄望于美国经济持续复苏，然而迄今为止，美国经济增长并未显著提速。此外，如果美联储(Fed)决定在年底前加息，美国经济充当减震器的能力可能打折扣。
　　The alternative is for the US dollar — rather than the economy — to play the role. China may not have intended to fire a shot across the Fed’s bows but the warning is clear: should the Fed choose to raise interest rates alongside a new “market-led” attitude from Beijing, the danger is that the dollar could climb into the stratosphere. Under those circumstances, we could see collapsing emerging market currencies, a currency-led tightening of US monetary conditions and an American recovery that all too quickly melts away. From a global perspective, it would make more sense for the Fed to leave monetary policy on hold.
　　另一种选择是让美元(而非美国经济)扮演这种角色。中国或许并非有意向美联储发出警告，但其中的警示意味却很明显：如果美联储选择加息，再加上北京方面的“市场导向”新态度，美元汇率很可能大幅攀升。在那种情况下，我们可能看到新兴市场货币崩溃，美国货币环境因汇率因素所致的紧缩，以及很快烟消云散的美国经济复苏。从全球角度来看，美联储保持货币政策不变更明智。
　　It is easy to criticise China’s internal imbalances. But failing to take into account the role these played in stabilising the global economy is a major mistake. It doubtless makes sense for China now to address its imbalances. Yet, as it does so, the rest of the world will need to find a new shock absorber. It’s not at all obvious whether any economy is up to the task.
　　批评中国内部失衡是很容易的。但如果不考虑这些失衡在稳定全球经济中的作用，那将是大错。中国现在解决其失衡问题无疑是明智的。然而，在中国这么做的时候，全球其他地区将需要找到一个新的减震器。是否有经济体可以担此重任，现在还一点都不明显。
　　Stephen King is HSBC’s senior economic adviser and author of ‘When the Money Runs Out’
　　本文作者是汇丰银行(HSBC)高级经济顾问，著有《当金钱枯竭：西方富裕日子的终结》(When the Money Runs Out)一书